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Abstract
We study the ability of banks and merchants to in°uence the consumer's payment
instrument choice. Consumers participate in payment card networks to insure them-
selves against three types of shocks| income, theft, and their merchant match. Mer-
chants choose which payment instruments to accept based on their production costs and
increased pro¯t opportunities. Our key results can be summarized as follows. The struc-
ture of prices is determined by the level of the bank's cost to provide payment services
including the level of aggregate credit loss, the probability of theft, and the timing of
income °ows. We also identify equilibria where the bank ¯nds it pro¯table to o®er one or
both payment cards. Our model predicts that when merchants are restricted to charging
a uniform price for goods that they sell, the bank bene¯ts while consumers and mer-
chants are worse o®. Finally, we compare welfare-maximizing price structures to those
that result from the bank's pro¯t-maximizing price structure.
Key Words: Retail Financial Services, Network E®ects, Social Welfare, Multihoming,
Payment Card Networks
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Over the last two decades, consumer usage and merchant acceptance of payment cards have
increased in advanced economies while cash and check usage has declined (Amromin and
Chakravorti, 2009, and Humphrey, 2004). Many observers argue that movement away from
paper-based payment instruments to electronic ones such as payment cards has increased
overall payment system e±ciency. However, policymakers in various jurisdictions have ques-
tioned the pricing of payment card services.1 The U.S. Congress is considering legislation
that would grant antitrust immunity to merchants to collectively negotiate fees with payment
providers. The European Commission prohibited MasterCard from imposing interchange
fees, the fee that the merchant's bank pays the cardholder's bank, for cross-border European
payment card transactions. Some public authorities around the world have removed restric-
tions by payment networks that prevent merchants from setting prices for goods and services
based on the payment instrument used.
We construct a model in the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) that analyzes the
pricing decision of banks in the provision of payment instruments to maximize pro¯ts in a
two-sided market. A market is said to be two-sided if two distinct sets of end-users are unable
to negotiate prices and the prices charged to each end-user a®ects the allocation of goods or
services (Armstrong, 2005 and Rochet and Tirole, 2006). Our model di®ers from the existing
literature in the following ways. For the most part, the recent payment card literature has
used a reduced form approach when considering the costs and bene¯ts of payment cards.2 In
our model, consumers participate in non-cash payment networks to insure themselves from
three types of shocks{ income, theft, and the type of merchant that they are matched to.
In other words, consumers bene¯t from consumption in states of the world that would not
be possible without payment cards. Consumers are willing to pay a ¯xed fee as long as
their expected utility when they participate in a card network is at least as great as their
expected utility if they only use cash. Furthermore, acceptance of payment cards may increase
merchant pro¯ts resulting from increased sales. Merchants trade o® increased pro¯ts against
additional payment costs in the forms of merchant card fees. Ultimately, optimal bank fees
1Bradford and Hayashi (2008) provide a summary of scrutiny of public authorities and courts in various
countries.
2Chakravorti and Emmons (2003), Chakravorti and To (2007), and McAndrews and Wang (2006) are
notable exceptions.
1are functions of the probability of getting mugged, the timing of consumer income °ows,
merchant costs and pass-through, bank payment processing costs, and the level of aggregate
credit loss.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. We derive conditions when merchants
accept one, two, or three payment instruments based on their costs and their ability to pass
on payment processing costs to consumers. The bank fully extracts consumer surplus before
the bank levies merchant fees. Merchant inability to pass on payment cost increases bank
pro¯t, since cost absorption by merchants leads to lower goods prices and higher consumer
revenues. Depending on card processing and default costs, banks may have an incentive to
simultaneously supply debit and credit cards. For relatively low credit card costs, the bank
would refrain from supplying debit cards and only o®er credit card services. The bank's pro¯t-
maximizing merchant fees are equal to or higher than the socially optimal fees for debit cards
and are always higher for credit cards. A social planner internalises the positive network
e®ects of increased merchant acceptance by setting lower merchant fees. Some welfare-
maximizing price structures may result in negative bank pro¯t. In these cases, the social
planner always sets zero ¯xed fees for consumers to fully maximize additional consumption
and merchant sales in the economy. However, if bank pro¯ts are restricted to be zero, di®erent
price structures emerge where both consumers and merchants pay positive fees. Finally, bank
pro¯t is higher when merchants are restricted from setting instrument-contingent pricing.
In the next section, we brie°y summarize the payment card literature. In section 3, we
describe the environment, agents, and payment technologies. We consider economies with
debit and credit cards in sections 4 and 5, respectively. We explore an economy where all
three instruments exist in section 6 and conclude in section 7.
2 Literature Review
Payment card networks consist of three types of players{consumers, merchants, and ¯nancial
institutions{ that participate in a payment network. Consumers establish relationships with
¯nancial institutions so that they can make payments that access funds from their accounts or
utilize credit facilities. They may be charged ¯xed fees in addition to ¯nance charges if they
borrow for an extended period of time. For consumers to use payment cards, merchants must
2accept them. Merchants establish relationships with ¯nancial institutions to convert card
payments into bank deposits and are generally charged per-transaction fees. Generally, the
merchant's bank, the acquirer, pays an interchange fee to the cardholder's bank, the issuer.
The underlying payment fee structure is determined by the interrelated bilateral relationships
among the players, their bargaining power, and the ability of the network to maximize pro¯ts
for its members.
The payment card literature can be separated into four strands.3 The ¯rst strand focuses
on the interchange fee and whether the payment providers' pro¯t-maximizing fee is lower or
higher than the socially optimal interchange fee. The second strand focuses on the ability
of merchants to separate card and cash users by using instrument-contingent prices. The
third strand considers the e®ect of platform competition on the structure of prices. The
fourth strand considers the role of credit and its bene¯ts to consumers and merchants. Some
research incorporates multiple strands but none to date has been able to include all four.
While most of the payment card literature started a decade or so ago, Baxter (1983) be-
gan the theoretical literature on payment cards. In his model, consumers are homogenous,
merchants are perfectly competitive, and issuers and acquirers operate in competitive mar-
kets. He found that the interchange fee balances the demands of consumers and merchants
and improves consumer and merchant welfare. Research that built upon Baxter relaxed
the assumptions of competitive markets for consumption goods and payment services and
introduced strategic interactions among consumers and merchants. Schamalensee (2002)
considers an environment where issuers and acquirers have market power and ¯nds that the
pro¯t-maximizing interchange fee may be the same as the socially optimal one. Rochet and
Tirole introduce merchant competition and consumer heterogeneity and ¯nd that business
stealing may result in the pro¯t-maximizing interchange fee being higher than the socially
optimal one. Wright (2004) ¯nds that introducing merchant heterogeneity results in the
pro¯t-maximizing interchange fee being potentially above or below the socially optimally
one.
For the most part, these models ignore the ability of merchants to steer consumers by
imposing instrument-contingent pricing. Carlton and Frankel (1995) argue that if merchants
are able to set instrument-contingent pricing, the interchange fee would be neutral. The
3For a review of the literature, see Bolt and Chakravorti (2008).
3interchange fee is said to be neutral if a change in the fee does not change the quantity
of consumer purchases and the level of merchant and bank pro¯ts. Several authors have
formalized this result. Gans and King (2003) ¯nd that if payment separation is achieved,
the interchange fee is neutral. Payment separation occurs in competitive markets where
merchants separate into cash and card stores or if monopolist merchants impose instrument-
contingent pricing. Schwartz and Vincent (2006) ¯nd that uniform prices harm cash users
and merchants, and may worsen overall consumer welfare. A key assumption in this strand
of the literature is that if there is pass-through of payment processing fees, merchants are
able to fully pass on their payment processing costs.
The payment card literature has also considered competition among payment networks.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Guthrie and Wright (2007) ¯nd that network competition does
not necessarily improve the structure of prices. Chakravorti and Rosen (2006) con¯rm this
result but also ¯nd cases where the reduction in the total price improves overall welfare even
when the resulting price structure is welfare dominated by the price structure when only one
network exists.
The models discussed so far did not consider an increase in total consumption result-
ing from payment card adoption. Chakravorti and Emmons (2003) and Chakravorti and
To (2007) focus on a key aspect of certain types of payment cards{the extension of credit.4
They construct models where aggregate consumption increases because credit cards enable
consumers without funds to purchase goods bene¯tting both consumers and merchants.
Chakravorti and Emmons ¯nd that illiquid consumers are willing to ¯nance the payment
card network. They also ¯nd that payment separation improves welfare by eliminating sub-
sidies to convenience users{those that do not need credit to make purchases. Chakravorti and
To demonstrate that merchants are willing to bear the cost of higher credit risk if their sales
increase. However, these models do not endogenously solve for the optimal price structure
between the two types of end-users.
In this article, we combine elements of all four strands of the literature by stressing price
structure in an environment where two types of payment cards may improve consumer and
merchant welfare. Speci¯cally, debit cards o®er consumers protection against theft. While
4While the most common form of payment cards that extend credit are credit cards, debit card issuers in
some countries allow their customers to access overdraft facilities. Generally, when debit card users access
overdraft facilities, they bear almost all of the cost of the credit extension.
4credit cards o®er theft protection, they also insure against income shocks unlike debit cards.
We study the ability of merchants to steer consumers by imposing instrument-contingent
pricing to achieve an equilibrium where they can separate consumers into those that have
funds from those that do not.
3 A Model of Payment Cards
3.1 Environment and Agents
There are three types of agents{ consumers, merchants, and a monopolist bank. In our
model, we have combined the issuer and acquirer into one entity so as to abstract from the
interchange fee decision between issuers and acquirers.5 All agents are risk neutral.6 A
continuum of ex ante identical consumers reside on a line segment from 0 to 1. A continuum
of monopolist merchants reside on a line segment from 0 to 1 di®erentiated by the type of
good and the cost that they face to serve each customer.
Consumers are subject to three shocks. First, consumers either receive income, I, in
the morning with probability, Á1, or at night with probability, Á2, or no income at all with
probability, 1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2, where Á1 + Á2 · 1. These probabilities are given exogenously.
Second, before leaving home, each consumer is randomly matched to a merchant selling a
unique good. Third, a cash-carrying consumer may also be mugged in transit to the merchant
with probability 1 ¡ ½ resulting in complete loss of income (and consumption).7
Consumers maximize expected utility. For computational ease, we make the following
assumptions about consumers. First, we assume a linear utility function u(x) = x. Second,
consumers only have positive utility when consuming goods sold by the merchant they are
matched to. Third, each consumer spends all her income during the day because she receives
no utility from unused income after that.
Merchant heterogeneity is based on the type of good that they sell and their cost. Each
merchant faces a unique exogenously given cost, °i. Merchant costs are uniformly distributed
5A four-party network is mathematically equivalent to a three-party network when issuing or acquiring is
perfectly competitive. In that case, the optimal interchange fee is directly derived from the optimal consumer
and merchant fee (e.g. Bolt, 2006).
6Our qualitative results would not change if consumers and merchants were risk averse. In fact, consumers
and merchants would be willing to pay more to participate in payment card networks.
7He, Huang, and Wright (2005) construct a search model of money and banking that endogenizes the
probability of theft.
5on a line segment from 0 to 1.8 Although merchants face di®erent costs, each merchant sells
its good at pm. For convenience, this price is set to 1. We make this assumption to capture
merchant pricing power heterogeneity in the economy in a tractable model. In other words,
this assumption re°ects that di®erent merchants have di®erent mark-ups across the economy.
The per customer (expected) pro¯t of merchant i when accepting cash, ¦i
m, is:
¦i
m = Á1½(1 ¡ °i)I:
In a cash-only economy, consumers cannot consume if they are mugged on the way to
the merchant or if their income arrives at night.9 In ¯gure 1, the probability tree for the
cash economy is diagrammed. As a benchmark, in a cash-only environment, the expected
consumption of a consumer is:
¹ uC
m = E[u(I)] = Á1½I;







The bank makes no pro¯t in a cash-only economy, ¹ ¦B
m = 0.
Expected total welfare is derived by summing up expected consumer utility, expected
merchant pro¯ts and expected bank pro¯ts. Speci¯cally, in a cash-only environment, total
welfare is given by:
Wm = ¹ uC
m + ¹ ¦M





3.2 Alternative Payment Technologies
The monopolist bank provides two types of payment instruments{ debit cards and credit
cards.10 Debit cards o®er consumers protection from theft and credit cards o®er protection
against theft and income shocks. The supply of debit and credit card services by the bank
8We would expect our results to be robust to di®erent distributions of merchant costs.
9We do not model the role of a central bank in providing ¯at money and the implications on price level.
An alternative interpretation of cash in our model is to assume that consumers receive income in the form of
a good that merchants consume.
10On average, the bank is endowed Á2I per consumer to lend to consumers during the day.
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increases the additional states of the world where consumption occurs. For convenience, we
assume that the bank charges non-negative payment fees to consumers and merchants.11
Consumers that choose to participate in a debit or credit card network sign fully en-
forceable contracts where their incomes are directly deposited into their bank accounts when
realized. The bank provides access to cash at no charge, but charges consumers membership
fees to use debit cards, Fdc ¸ 0, and credit cards, Fcc ¸ 0, that are deducted from their
payroll deposits upon arrival.12 We denote FT as the total ¯xed fee charged to consumers
for participation in both networks. The bank sets merchant per-transaction fees, fdc ¸ 0 and
fcc ¸ 0, for debit and credit card transactions, respectively.13 In reality, di®erent merchants
face di®erent fees for payment services. For convenience, we only consider one fee for all
merchants.14
To maintain tractability and still capture some key characteristics of payments cards, we
make the following assumptions about merchant pricing. First, for time consistency reasons,
merchants cannot charge higher prices than those they posted when consumers made their
decision to join one or more payment networks. Second, we assume that all merchants will
post the same price for their goods given the payment instrument used to make the purchase.
11Our model is able to consider negative fees in a straightforward way. However, allowing negative fees
makes the analysis more complex without gaining additional insight. Note, that negative merchant fees do
not increase merchant acceptance any further, so that bank pro¯ts will only decrease for larger negative fees.
Therefore, allowing negative fees will not a®ect optimal pricing. Only when the pass-through parameter gets
very close or equal to zero, the optimal pricing characterization changes.
12Clearly, the bank can use a strategy to price cash as well. We ignore this aspect primarily because of the
complexity of solving a model with six di®erent prices for payment services. However, banks generally do not
charge for cash withdrawals from their own automated teller machines in advanced economies.
13This fee structure captures what we observe in many countries. Generally, consumers do not pay per-
transaction fees when using their payment cards, but merchants generally do pay the bulk of their payment
service fees on a per-transaction basis.
14However, di®erent merchant fees based on di®erences in costs would enable greater extraction of merchant
surplus while ensuring the largest network.
7Merchants set pdc for goods purchased with a debit card and set pcc for goods purchased with
a credit card. Each merchant is unable to fully endogenize the cost of payment processing
in terms of the price for its good. In reality, merchants would set prices based on the fee
it faces and the demand elasticity of its own customers. However, given our focus to derive
payment service fees in a tractable model, we introduce a merchant pricing rule that captures
the ability of merchants to pass on payment processing costs to consumers, albeit imperfectly.
Note that many merchants do not set instrument-contingent pricing but may set one uniform
price. We will consider such merchant pricing later in the paper.
In our model, we consider an exogenous parameter, ¸j, to capture a continuum of pass-
through from none to complete.15 By separating market power from pass through, we are
able to consider industries where pro¯t margins are slim but payment cards are accepted,
e.g. discount airlines that often impose credit card surcharges in jurisdictions where they are
allowed to do so. We consider the following pricing rule. Let us consider two polar cases{ the
merchant is unable to pass any payment costs to consumers, pdc = pcc = pm = 1, or is able
to pass on all of its cost to consumers, pj = 1=(1 ¡ fj), j = dc;cc. The level of pass-through
is determined exogenously by ¸j 2 [0;1]. Thus, pj is given by:
pj(fj) =
1
1 ¡ fj(1 ¡ ¸j)
; j = dc;cc: (1)
When ¸j = 1, merchants cannot pass on any payment processing costs in the form of higher
prices to consumers. When ¸j = 0, merchants are able to pass on all payment processing
costs to consumers.16 If there is complete pass-through of payment costs to merchants in
the form of higher prices, the balance of prices does not matter. We assume that merchants
are not able to increase their prices beyond the recovery of payment processing costs. For
reference, we list the exogenous and endogenous variables that appear in our model in table 1.
When participating in payment networks, consumers that received their income in the
morning have less disposable income to spend at merchants than in the cash-only economy.
Given our assumption of atomistic merchants and no collusion, merchants a®ect the level
of the consumer's ¯xed fee. In other words, if all consumers participate in payment card
15The parameter ¸j can also be interpreted as the bargaining power between consumers and merchants.
16See Weyl (2008) for a discussion on the ability to pass through costs in a two-sided market.
8Table 1: Variables in the Model
Exogenous variables:
I Income for consumer
Á1 Probability of receiving income before shopping
Á2 Probability of receiving income after shopping
½ Probability of not getting robbed when carrying cash
°i Merchant-speci¯c cost
pm Price for good if paying by cash
¸dc Proportion of debit card merchant fee absorbed by merchants
¸cc Proportion of credit card merchant fee absorbed by merchants
cdc Bank's per-transaction cost to process debit card transaction
ccc Bank's per-transaction cost to process debit card transaction
Endogenous variables:
® Proportion of merchants accepting debit cards
¯ Proportion of merchants accepting credit cards
pdc Price of good if paying with debit card
pcc Price of good if paying with credit card
Fdc Fixed consumer fee for debit card
Fcd Fixed consumer fee for credit card
fdc Per-transaction merchant fee for debit card
fcc Per-transaction merchant fee for credit card
networks, aggregate consumer disposable income has also decreased and cash-only merchants
would receive less revenue as well. However, there is a tradeo® between a lower level of
disposable income and the probability of no sale if the consumer is mugged or does not have
funds.
The timing of events is depicted in ¯gure 2. In the early morning, the bank posts its
prices for payment services, merchants announce their acceptance of payment products and
their prices, and consumers choose which payment networks to participate in. Next, some
consumers realize their income and are matched with a speci¯c merchant. Consumers decide
which payment instrument to use before leaving home based on the merchant acceptance
and their prices. During the day, consumers go shopping. At night, consumers that did not
receive income in the morning may receive income and pay back their credit card obligations.
The bank faces losses from credit card consumers that never receive income.
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4 Cash and Debit Cards
In this section, we will limit our analysis to an economy with cash and debit cards. When
compared to cash, debit cards are more secure for consumers to carry than cash because cash-
carrying consumers have some probability of being mugged. We endogenously determine the
proportion of merchants that accepts debit cards and denote it as ®. Because debit cards
may not be accepted by all merchants, consumers must use cash for some purchases. In
¯gure 3, we diagram additional states of nature when consumption occurs when debit cards
exist. Consumers can consume in an additional ®(1 ¡ ½) states of nature.
Consumers are willing to participate in a debit card network if the ¯xed fee, Fdc, is less
than or equal to the expected utility from additional consumption. In other words, the
following inequality must be satis¯ed:
½Á1I · Á1
µ





This inequality yields the maximum debit card fee, Fmax
dc , that consumers are willing to pay
as a function of exogenous parameters, ½, Á1, and I, and endogenous parameters, ® and
pdc. Given that consumers must commit to the membership fee before being matched to a
merchant, all consumers purchasing from stores that accept debit cards will always use their
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debit cards and leave home without cash, because they face a positive probability of being
mugged when carrying cash.
Merchants must make at least as much pro¯t from accepting debit cards than only ac-










Note that by accepting debit cards merchants attract additional sales because of safe transit
of consumers. Moreover, merchants can increase their goods price from pm to pdc to o®set
their cost.
Merchants accept debit cards only when ¦i
m · ¦i
dc.17 This inequality yields a threshold
cost °dc, below which merchants accept debit cards for payment. Note that cash-only mer-
chants are strictly worse o® because consumers that arrive at their stores have less disposible
income. Having substituted debit card pricing rule (1) in °dc, the proportion of merchants
willing to accept debit cards is:
®(fdc) = Pr[°i · °dc] = °dc =
1 ¡ fdc ¡ ½
1 ¡ fdc(1 ¡ ¸dc) ¡ ½
: (2)
As the degree of pass-through increases, more and more merchants are able to accept debit
cards. We observe that ®(fdc;½;¸dc) 2 [0;1] if and only if fdc 2 [0;1 ¡ ½] and ¸dc > 0. Note
that if merchants are able to fully pass on costs to consumers (¸dc = 0), all merchants will
17Our model does not capture business stealing incentives as a driver for card acceptance. See Rochet and
Tirole (2003) and Wirght (2004).
11accept debit cards (® = 1), regardless of the fee.










Equation (3) expresses the highest ¯xed fee, Fmax
dc , that consumers are willing to pay
given the probability of not getting mugged, ½, and the merchant fee, fdc. The probability
of getting mugged must be greater than or equal to the merchant fee. Furthermore, the
consumer fee internalizes the network e®ect that consumers are willing to pay higher fees
when more merchants accept the card. However, this e®ect is dampened by a potential
decrease in purchasing power depending on the degree to which merchants increase their
price for debit card purchases. Merchant acceptance of debit cards is higher when fdc is
lower except when there is full pass-through. However, with full pass-through, consumers
pay all of the merchants processing costs and must be compensated with a lower ¯xed fee.
Now, we solve the bank's pro¯t maximization problem for the consumer and merchant
fees. The bank maximizes its expected per-consumer pro¯t:
¦B
dc(Fdc;fdc;®) = Á1 (®(fdc ¡ cdc)(I ¡ Fdc)) + (Á1 + Á2)Fdc: (4)
Note that the bank only makes money when debit cards are accepted and used, i.e. ® > 0.
A fraction (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2) of ¯xed fee revenue is lost, because some consumers never receive
income. Thus, the bank is able to capture fees from consumers receiving income at night
even though these consumers are unable to consume. Substituting Fmax
dc (fdc) and ®(fdc) in










I; fdc 2 [0;1 ¡ ½];
0; fdc > 1 ¡ ½:
(5)
Notice that for merchant fees larger than the probability of getting mugged (1 ¡ ½), there
is no merchant acceptance (® = 0) resulting in consumers not willing to pay for debit cards
18All proofs of lemmas and propositions are in the appendix.
12Fmax
dc = 0. Hence, bank pro¯ts are zero for large merchant fees. For fdc 2 [0;1 ¡ ½], let us
denote f¤
dc(cdc;½;Á1;Á2;¸dc) as the merchant fee such that d¦B
dc(fdc)=dfdc = 0. The following
proposition characterizes the pro¯t-maximizing fee.
Proposition 1 The debit card merchant fee f¤
dc that maximizes ¦B







dc(cdc;½;Á1;Á2;¸dc) i® cdc · cdc · ¹ cdc;




(¸dc + ½ ¡ 1)Á1
and ¹ cdc =
(1 ¡ ½)(¸dc(Á1 + Á2) + ½Á1)
½Á1
:
When the processing cost, cdc, decreases, the optimal merchant fee, f¤
dc, decreases and will
hit the zero boundary f¤
dc = 0 at ccd = cdc. At this point, merchant acceptance is complete.19
Depending on the bank's per-transaction processing cost, the optimal fee f¤
dc results in a debit
card price, p¤
dc(f¤
dc); and an optimal merchant acceptance, ®¤(f¤
dc). In turn, the consumer's
¯xed debit card fee follows from Fmax
dc (f¤
dc).
Our model identi¯es three ranges of fees. When the cost of providing payment services is
su±ciently low, consumers pay all of the payment processing costs (i.e. a corner solution). As
the bank cost rises and consumers are unable to bear the full cost, merchants pay a positive
fee (i.e. an interior solution). However, if the bank cost is too high, neither consumers nor
merchants are willing to pay for debit cards.
Our result is in contrast to earlier models that focused on interchange fees and ignored
¯xed fees. However, we feel that our result has empirical support. For example, in 2007 in the
Netherlands, 25 million debit cards were issued carrying an annual ¯xed fee for consumers
around 7.50 euros, accounting for 180 million euros revenue for debit card issuers. On
the other hand, given 1.8 billion debit card transactions in 2007 and a merchant fee of
about 5 euro cents per transaction, revenues amounted to 90 million euros for debit card
acquirers. In other words, consumers pay twice as much in aggregate debit card fees than
merchants. Furthermore, often, debit card fees are bundled into the total price of services
19Lowering merchant fees even further would not increase merchant acceptance, but would reduce bank
pro¯ts. Hence, zero merchant fees would still yield maximum bank pro¯ts, even when negative fees (\rebates")
were allowed.
13tied to transactions accounts that might include implicit fees such as forgone interest. While
inexact, one proxy for deciphering a market-based debit card fee would be to look at the fees
imposed on bank-issued prepaid cards that have similar characteristics to debit cards. These
fees can range from 5% to 15% of the value of the card while the merchant interchange fee is
usually below 1% and often a minimal ¯xed fee.
4.1 Debit Card Equilibria
Figure 4 shows the two di®erent cases. The left panel shows that f¤
dc = 0 for low bank costs,
which then induces full merchant acceptance ®¤(0) = 1, a debit card goods price p¤
dc(0) = 1,
and a ¯xed debit card fee of Fmax
dc (0) = (1 ¡ ½)I. For a higher bank cost, the optimal debit
card fee is an interior solution inducing incomplete merchant acceptance ®¤ < 1 and p¤
dc > 1.
Note that when no income arrives at night (i.e. Á2 = 0), increasing the net cost of providing
debit cards results in the optimal merchant debit card fee being always larger than zero,
f¤
dc > 0, for strictly positive processing costs cdc > 0.
First, let us consider when ¸dc > 0. In equilibrium, parameter values determine the
proportion of what the bank charges merchants and consumers. The maximum fdc is bounded
from above by 1 ¡ ½. Consumers' willingness to pay increases as more merchants accept
cards. Given the two-sided nature of our model, the network e®ect results in asymmetric
price structure in the sense that the bank extracts surplus ¯rst from consumers and then
from merchants.
The ability of merchants to pass on costs to consumers a®ects bank pro¯ts.
Proposition 2 As the ability of merchants to pass on costs to consumers decreases, the






As ¸dc approaches 1, the bank is able to set a higher Fdc because of an increase in
the consumer's purchasing power from a lower pdc. However, ® decreases even though fdc
decreases resulting from the merchant's absorption of fdc rising faster than the reduction in
fdc.
Now, let us consider the special case of full pass-through, ¸dc = 0. Given our pricing
14Figure 4: Bank debit card pro¯ts










Note: In left panel, cdc = 0 and f¤
dc = 0; in right panel, 0 < cdc · ¹ cdc and f¤
dc 2 (0;1 ¡ ½]. Other
parameter values: ½ = 0:99, Á1 = 0:98, Á2 = 0, ¸dc = 0:5, and I = 30000. These values yield: cdc = 0
and ¹ cdc = 0:015.
rule (1), full pass-through induces ® = 1. In other words, the bank is unable to extract any
surplus from merchants. Consumers bear the full cost of the debit card network. When
¸dc = 0 resulting in pdc = 1=(1¡fdc), the bank's optimal merchant fee is zero.20 For ¸dc close
to zero, however, and for small enough processing cost, the bank's optimal fee is zero. As
pass-through increases, consumers need to be compensated with lower ¯xed fees because their
purchasing power falls. To achieve that, the bank sets the merchant fee as low as possible,
thus lowering goods prices while generating a strong network e®ect, so that consumers are
willing to join the debit card network by paying Fmax
dc = (1 ¡ ½)I.
At ¯rst glance, one might conclude that bank pro¯ts are independent of the price struc-
ture. However, this is not the case. The bank faces a real resource cost only when transactions
are processed and this cost is based on the transaction size. As Fdc increases, consumers are
left with less disposable income but higher purchasing power resulting in a lower transaction
cost while maintaining their cash-only consumption level.
4.2 Debit Card Welfare
In this section, we compare the social planner's welfare maximizing consumer and merchant
fees to the bank pro¯t-maximizing fees. We de¯ne total welfare as the sum of expected utility,
20With ¸dc = 0, the bank would want to set a merchant fee below 0, and the price structure would not
matter anymore. In other words, the price structure is neutral.
15or pro¯ts, of the three types of agents, the consumer, the merchant, and the bank or:
Wdc(Fdc;fdc;®;pdc) = ¹ uC
dc + ¹ ¦M
dc + ¹ ¦B
dc:
If debit cards are introduced, expected total welfare may increase. Consumers expected
























The expected bank's pro¯t is:
¹ ¦B
dc = Á1®(fdc ¡ cdc)(I ¡ Fdc) + (Á1 + Á2)Fdc:
If the social planner is able to only set bank fees, it should maximize total welfare Wdc
under the merchant's participation constraint:21
®(fdc) = °dc =
1 ¡ fdc ¡ ½
1 ¡ fdc(1 ¡ ¸dc) ¡ ½
:




Let us denote fSW
d (cdc;½;¸dc) = 0 the fee such that @Wdc=@fdc = 0:
Proposition 3 Social welfare Wdc(Fdc;fdc) in a debit card system is characterized by:
FSW






d (cdc;½;¸dc) if csw
dc · cdc · csw
dc
0 if cdc < csw
dc
;
21If a social planner wants to achieve a ¯rst best solution, it should allocate payment terminals to merchants,
depending on their cost type in addition to imposing the fee structure. However, such a strategy would require
the planner to know the merchants' costs functions. Given the di±culty in implementing such a plan, we




(1 ¡ ½)(1 + ¸dc)
2¸dc
and csw
dc = (1 ¡ ½)(1 + ¸dc):
Note that Fdc = 0 in a social optimum to ensure that all income is used to generate pro¯ts
for merchants and consumption for consumers. The socially optimal consumer fee is far away
from the bank pro¯t-maximizing consumer fee. The zero fee for consumers prevents leakage.
In other words, consumer income spent on fees does not generate additional consumption for
consumers and additional sales for merchants. However, our model does not capture social
bene¯ts of positive bank pro¯t in the long run. For example, if the bank uses these pro¯ts
to improve the system, social welfare in may increase in the future o®setting any reduction
in the current period. Such analysis is beyond the scope of this article. We encourage future
research to explore this issue.
In terms of merchant pricing, we observe that the characterization of (second-best) social
welfare is similar to pro¯t maximization. For low enough processing costs, merchant fees
are set to zero and merchant acceptance is complete, ®SW = ®(fSW
dc ) = 1. When costs
become larger, merchants start to support the debit card network and acceptance decreases,
®SW < 1. For extremely high bank costs, merchant fees become too high to sustain any
card acceptance, ®SW = 0, and only cash is used.
Proposition 4 Socially optimal debit card merchant fees are equal to or lower than pro¯t
maximizing merchant fees for su±ciently small processing costs. That is,
i) fSW
dc = f¤
dc = 0 if cdc · cdc;
ii) fSW
dc = 0 < f¤




Socially optimal consumer ¯xed fees are always set to zero, and thus lower than pro¯t maxi-
mizing consumer ¯xed fees. That is, FSW
dc = 0 < ¹ F¤
dc:
The following table illustrates our results. We observe that for high processing costs the
cash-only economy dominates the debit card economy when the bank maximizes its pro¯ts.
17Table 2: Welfare comparison of debit card outcomes
low cost: cdc = 0:005 high cost: cdc = 0:015
(best) (best)
Cash Social Zero Pro¯t Social Zero Pro¯t
Opt Pro¯t Max Opt Pro¯t Max
fdc - 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.008
Fdc - 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.002
® - 1.000 0.906 0.795 0.536 0.007 0.211
pdc - 1.000 1.000 1.001 1.001 1.002 1.002
¹ uC
dc (0.970) 0.980 0.975 0.970 0.975 0.970 0.970
¹ ¦M
dc (0.485) 0.490 0.487 0.484 0.486 0.485 0.484
¹ ¦B
dc (0.000) -0.005 0.000 0.005 -0.005 0.000 0.000
Wdc (1.455) 1.465 1.463 1.460 1.456 1.455 1.454
Note: Parameter values set to ½ = 0:99, Á1 = 0:98, Á2 = 0, ¸dc = 0:75, and I = 1.
We also observe that socially optimal pricing leads to negative pro¯ts for the bank. This is a
straightforward ¯nding for a market with (two-sided) network e®ects (see Hermalin and Katz,
2004, and Bolt and Tieman, 2008). Under \Ramsey" pricing, where the bank just breaks even,
di®erent socially optimal price structures may arise. Obviously, a ¯xed consumer fee of zero
and a merchant per-transaction fee equal to processing costs (i.e. Fdc = 0; fdc = cdc) is one
option to guarantee zero pro¯ts. Another option is to set the ¯xed fee to its maximum Fmax
dc
and to solve for the corresponding merchant fee that yields zero pro¯ts. In welfare terms,
these di®erent (Fdc; fdc) combinations with zero pro¯ts trigger a tradeo® between merchant
acceptance and the level of the ¯xed fee. A lower ¯xed fee gives more expected consumer
utility, but induces also a higher merchant fee with lower acceptance, decreasing expected
merchant's bene¯ts. This tradeo® is in°uenced by the real resource cost of processing cards
as is shown in Table 2. With low processing cost, social optimal price structure pushes for
high acceptance, requiring a relatively high ¯xed fee in a balanced budget situation (see zero-
pro¯t column in Table 2 with low cost). For high processing cost, more weight is given to a
low ¯xed fee and acceptance is kept minimal as to avoid the real resource cost of processing
(see zero-pro¯t column in Table 2 with high cost).
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5 Cash and Credit Cards
In addition to being as secure as debit cards, credit cards allow consumption when consumers
have not received income before they go shopping if merchants accept them. Merchants
bene¯t from making sales to those without funds. An endogenously-determined proportion
of ¯ merchants accepts credit cards. Figure 5 shows the probability tree corresponding to an
economy with credit card consumption. Consumers are able to consume in ¯(1¡½)+¯(1¡Á1)
additional states of nature when participating in a credit card network than when only making
cash purchases.
Consumers are willing to hold a credit card if their expected consumption from participat-









Solving (as an equality) yields the maximum credit card fee Fmax
cc that consumers are willing
to pay.










Merchants must make at least as much pro¯t from accepting credit cards as accepting only
cash.22 Furthermore, as in the debit card case, all consumers purchasing from stores that
22As in the debit card case, consumers have less disposable income to spend at merchants than in the
19accept credit cards will always use their credit cards to reduce their probability of being
mugged. These conditions imply a threshold value of merchant cost, °cc, below which
merchants will accept credit cards. This threshold value °cc determines merchant's acceptance
of credit cards. Substituting the pricing rule, pcc(fcc), yields:
¯(fcc) = Pr[°i · °cc] = °cc =
1 ¡ fcc ¡ ½Á1
1 ¡ fcc(1 ¡ ¸cc) ¡ ½Á1
: (6)
We observe that ¯(fcc) 2 [0;1] if and only if fcc 2 [0;1 ¡ ½Á1] and ¸cc > 0. With full
pass-through, ¸cc = 0, merchant acceptance is complete, ¯(fcc) = 1 for all fcc:











cc (fcc) = 0 when fcc = 1 ¡ ½Á1. Furthermore, a consumer is willing to
pay more for a credit card than a debit card, all else equal, because credit cards o®er more
bene¯ts, namely consumption in no income states when matched with a credit card accepting
merchant.
The bank maximizes its pro¯ts:
¦B
cc(Fcc;fcc;¯) = ¯(fcc ¡ ccc)(I ¡ Fcc) + (Á1 + Á2)Fcc ¡ ¯(1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)(I ¡ Fcc): (8)
When issuing credit cards, the bank faces a certain aggregate loss from consumers that never
receive income. Note if income always arrives, i.e. Á2 = 1 ¡ Á1, there is no credit loss.
Substituting ¯ = ¯(fcc) and Fcc = Fmax










I; fcc 2 [0;1 ¡ ½Á1];
0; fcc > 1 ¡ ½Á1:
(9)
Similar to debit cards, observe that the function ¦B
cc(fcc) is continuous in fcc ¸ 0, and that
cash-only economy. Given our assumption of atomistic merchants and no collusion, merchants are unable to
internalize the loss in disposable income from the consumer's ¯xed fee in an economy with credit cards. If
merchants could do so, their participation threshold would occur at a lower fee. Note that the social planner
is able to internalize this e®ect.
20the pro¯t maximizing credit card fee, f¤
cc, lies between 0 and 1 ¡ ½Á1 for su±ciently small
processing costs. Denote this fee by f¤
cc(ccc;½;Á1;Á2;¸cc), that satis¯es d¦B
cc=dfcc = 0. The
following proposition characterizes the pro¯t-maximizing credit card fee.
Proposition 5 The credit card fee f¤
cc that maximizes ¦B







cc(ccc;½;Á1;Á2;¸cc) i® ccc · ccc · ¹ ccc;
0 i® 0 · ccc < ccc;
where
ccc =
¡¸cc(1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)
¸cc + ½Á1 ¡ 1
and ¹ ccc =
(1 ¡ ½)¸cc(Á1 + Á2) + ½Á1((1 ¡ ½)Á1 + Á2)
½Á1
:
Unlike the debit card case, the bank has two types of costs{ per-transaction cost to
operate the system and credit losses from consumers who make credit card purchases but do
not receive income in the night. Once the bank has fully extracted surplus from consumers,
it attempts to capture surplus from merchants to fund the loss if possible to do so. Notice
that if the probability of safely reaching the store with income is su±ciently high, the bank
will always capture some surplus from the merchants, that is, f¤
cc > 0 for all ccc ¸ 0, if
½Á1 > 1 ¡ ¸cc:
5.1 Credit Card Equilibria
Three sources contribute to credit card bank pro¯ts: merchant revenue (RM
cc ), consumer
revenue (RC
cc), and total costs (CT
cc) which is the sum of total processing costs and default
































bL j2=1-j1: Hzero default lossL
Note: Given parameter values ½ = 0:99, Á1 = 0:98, ccc = 0:015, ¸cc = 0:5, and I = 30000, in panel a)
we calculate f¤
cc = 0:021 for Á2 = 0, and in panel b) f¤
cc = 0:007 for Á2 = 0:02. The cut o® value that
yields f¤
cc = ccc is ¹ Á2 = 0:008.
where
RM
cc = ¯(fcc)(I ¡ Fmax
cc );
RC
cc = (Á1 + Á2)Fmax
cc ;
CT
cc = ¡¯(ccc + (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2))(I ¡ Fmax
cc ):
Figure 6 shows the bank pro¯t and its components for the two polar cases: Á2 = 0 and
Á2 = 1 ¡ Á1. Given a su±ciently large ccc, merchant share of payment costs increases as
credit risk goes up. As a result, we conclude that merchants pay a greater share of the
total price when default losses can no longer be extracted from consumers. In other words,
as additional bene¯ts to merchants increase and the ability of consumers to pay decreases,
merchants carry a larger share of the cost.
Proposition 6 For su±ciently large ccc, there exists ¹ Á2 2 [0;1 ¡ Á1] such that f¤
cc = ccc for
Á2 = ¹ Á2.
Regarding comparative statics, if Á2 < ¹ Á2 then lowering fees to the cost level, fcc = ccc,
increases merchant acceptance and reduces goods prices pcc. This allows a higher ¯xed credit
card fee for consumers. But the bank loses on the merchant side by lowering merchant fees,
and su®ers more default losses as credit card acceptance gets more widespread. These latter
22e®ects dominate resulting in lower bank pro¯t. The reverse case, when Á2 > ¹ Á2, raising fees
to fcc = ccc induces lower merchant acceptance and higher goods prices. This leads to lower
¯xed fees, but also to lower default losses. On net, the bank's pro¯t decreases.
Similar to the debit card case, when ¸cc = 1 (pcc = pm = 1) bank pro¯t is higher. The
inability of merchants to pass any processing costs to consumers results in lower merchant
acceptance and lower goods prices. This induces higher ¯xed fees and lower default losses,
yielding higher bank pro¯ts. In other words, the bank extracts rents from both consumers
and merchants. Full pass-through, on the other hand, with ¸cc = 0 and pcc = 1=(1 ¡ fcc)
corresponds to a corner solution with f¤
cc = 0 (where non-negativity binds). As in the debit
card case, this perverse e®ect results from the bank transferring rents from the consumer to
the merchant so that transaction dollar volume decreases.
5.2 Credit Card Welfare
Credit cards may improve on debit cards because they allow consumption when income has
not arrived yet. Total welfare for credit can be written as:
Wcc(Fcc;fcc;¯;pcc) = ¹ uC
cc + ¹ ¦M
cc + ¹ ¦B
cc:
But they are costly in terms of real processing cost and default loss. A social planner must
trade o® increased bene¯ts against increased costs of all parties involved. Consumers expected
























Expected bank pro¯t is given by:
¹ ¦B
cc = ¯(fcc ¡ ccc)(I ¡ Fcc) + (Á1 + Á2)Fcc ¡ ¯(1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)(I ¡ Fcc):
Since credit cards increase consumption possibilities, social welfare is higher than in the
23Table 3: Welfare comparison of credit card outcomes
low cost: ccc = 0:005 high cost: ccc = 0:015
Cash Social Pro¯t Social Pro¯t
Opt Max Opt Max
fcc - 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.019
Fcc - 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.011
¯ - 1.000 0.626 0.991 0.434
pc - 1.000 1.003 1.000 1.005
¹ uC
dc (0.970) 1.000 0.970 1.000 0.970
¹ ¦M
dc (0.485) 0.500 0.482 0.500 0.482
¹ ¦B
dc (0.000) -0.025 0.009 -0.035 0.004
Wcc (1.455) 1.475 1.461 1.465 1.456
Note: Parameter values set to ½ = 0:99, Á1 = 0:98, Á2 = 0, ¸cc = 0:75, and I = 1.
debit card case (all else being equal), which can be seen from the next table. Observe that
for Á1 = 1 and Á2 = 0 (and ¸cc = ¸dd) the above mentioned proposition is the same as in the
debit card case. In our model, all else being equal, without income uncertainty (and default
loss) credit cards completely reduce to debit cards. Similar to the social optimal debit card
fees, the planner sets consumer fees to zero and extracts from merchants for high processing
costs.23 That is:
Proposition 7 With credit cards, socially optimal merchant fees are lower than pro¯t max-
imizing merchant fees for su±ciently small processing costs. That is, if Á1½ > 1 ¡ ¸cc then:
fSW
cc = 0 < f¤
cc for 0 < ccc · csw
cc :
Socially optimal consumer ¯xed fees are always set to zero, and thus lower than pro¯t maxi-
mizing ¯xed fees. That is, FSW
cc = 0 < Fmax
cc :
Table 3 illustrate these ¯ndings. The extra functionality of credit cards, insurance against
negative income shocks, becomes obsolete if all consumers receive income in the morning.
However, when Á1 < 1, credit cards become useful for consumers and merchants, and banks
23Similar to the debit card case, the planner could implement a ¯rst best solution by setting fees and
allocating acceptance terminals. However, as described above this is di±cult to implement.
24may make a pro¯t supplying credit cards. Possible cost di®erentials (ccc vs. cdc) and/or cost
absorption di®erentials (¸cc vs. ¸dc) will determine whether banks prefer to supply credit
cards or debit cards.
Figure 7 compares credit card and debit card pro¯ts when Á1 < 1 and Á2 = 0. In panel
(a) all other parameters are equal, and naturally, maximum credit card pro¯ts are higher
than maximum debit card pro¯ts. When credit card cost increase relative to debit card cost,
credit card pro¯ts will go down, and for large enough cost di®erentials, banks would opt for
supplying debit cards. This is depicted in panel (b) where the cost di®erential is large enough
to yield the same level of bank pro¯t, although credit card fees for the retailer are higher.
Welfare comparison shows that socially optimal debit card merchant fees coincide with pro¯t
maximizing debit card merchant fees for small processing cost. This is generally not the case
with credit cards, which almost always generate higher pro¯t maximizing fees.
6 Full Multihoming
In this section, we will consider the case when the bank provides both debit and credit cards
simultaneously. Unlike the previous two cases, when cards always dominated cash, con-
sumers may not choose the same payment instrument in all income states when all payment
instruments are accepted. If consumers are multihoming, they consider the bene¯ts of each
card before going to the store including any price di®erences based on the payment instru-
ment used. By di®erentiating debit card and credit card purchase prices, merchants may be
able to steer some consumers to the low-cost payment instrument. However, when merchants
are unable to price di®erentiate and post one price, consumers do not face any price induce-
ments in the store, and are assumed to opt for the instrument with the greatest functionality,
regardless of whether they have income or not.24
6.1 Instrument-Contingent Pricing
Let us now consider the case when consumers hold both debit and credit cards, and merchants
are able to price di®erentiate between cash, debit and credit cards. Note that all merchants
post the same prices based on the payment instrument used. First, we analyze the case
24In reality, consumers may be given rewards to use more costly payment instruments. We do not consider
these inducements.




















Note: Parameter values set equal to ½ = 0:99, Á1 = 0:98, Á2 = 0, ¸cc = ¸dc = 0:5, and I = 30000. In
panel a) we set cdc = ccc = 0:010, in panel b) ccc = 0:017 and cdc = 0:010.
when pdc < pcc. The di®erent possibilities are shown in Figure 8, note that we assume that
the optimal merchant fee to accept debit cards is lower than the optimal merchant fee to
accept credit cards because of underlying exgenous parameters such as bank processing costs
and theft and the pass-through parameter of debit and credit cards being close to each other.
This results in credit acceptance being smaller than debit card acceptance (® ¸ ¯).25 The
following inequality must be satis¯ed for consumers already holding debit cards, to hold credit
cards:
Á1 [(1 ¡ ®)½(I ¡ Fdc) + ®(I ¡ Fdc)=pdc] ·
Á1 [(1 ¡ ®)½(I ¡ Fdc ¡ Fcc) + ®(I ¡ Fdc ¡ Fcc)=pdc]+
(1 ¡ Á1)¯(I ¡ Fdc ¡ Fcc)=pcc:
Because consumers pay a lower price when using their debit cards (pdc < pcc), they will use
credit cards only when they have not yet received their income. The inequality yields the
maximum credit card fee Fmax
cc (Fdc) that consumers are willing to pay, given that they have
already joined the debit card network.
Consumers will multihome when each payment instrument yields bene¯ts greater than
the cost to participate. The maximum total card fee Fmax






¯(1 ¡ Á1)pdc + (pcc=pdc)Á1®(1 ¡ pdc½)
¯(1 ¡ Á1)pdc + (pcc=pdc)Á1(®(1 ¡ pdc½) + pdc½)
I: (10)
25Observe that pdc < pcc and ® ¸ ¯ imply restrictions on the optimal merchant fees, that must hold (ex
post) in equilibrium.
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When consumers multihome, only the total ¯xed fee matters and not the fee attributed
to each card. Consumers are willing to spend up to Fmax
T in return for participating in both
the debit and credit card networks.
Merchant's acceptance of cards is determined by threshold costs °dc for debit cards and
°cc for credit cards. On the margin, the merchant has to trade o® the bene¯ts of accepting
debit and credit cards to accepting cash only. As shown in sections 4 and 5, the proportion
of merchants willing to accept debit cards is:
®(fdc) =
1 ¡ fdc ¡ ½
1 ¡ fdc(1 ¡ ¸dc) ¡ ½
; (11)
and to accept credit cards is:
¯(fcc) =
1 ¡ fcc ¡ ½Á1
1 ¡ fcc(1 ¡ ¸cc) ¡ ½Á1
: (12)
Substituting price rules (1), and acceptance rules (11) and (12) in ¯xed total fee (10)
yields the maximum total card fee as a function of only the merchant card fees and other
exogenous variables.
Lemma 3 The maximum total card fee, Fmax
T ; is:
Fmax
T (fdc;fcc) = ·I; (13)
27where · =
Á1
2½2 + Á1(fdcÁ1 + fcc(Á1 ¡ 2)(¸cc ¡ 1) ¡ 2)½ + (fcc(Á1 ¡ 1) ¡ fdcÁ1 + 1)(fcc(¸cc ¡ 1) + 1)
(fcc(Á1 ¡ 1) ¡ fdcÁ1 + 1)(fcc(¸cc ¡ 1) + 1) + Á1(fdcÁ1 + fcc(Á1 ¡ 1)(¸cc ¡ 1) ¡ 1)½
:
As in the previous cases, note that the maximum card fee does not depend on Á2 and the
pass-through parameter for debit ¸dc. The bank's problem is to maximize pro¯ts by setting
fees for debit and credit cards. When merchants charge more for goods that are purchased
by credit cards than debit cards, the bank's pro¯t function is:
¦B
mh(FT;fdc;fcc;®;¯) = (Á1®(fdc ¡ cdc) + (1 ¡ Á1)¯(fcc ¡ ccc))(I ¡ FT)+ (14)
(Á1 + Á2)FT ¡ (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)¯(I ¡ FT):
Under multihoming the bank can always replicate the debit card equilibrium by setting




dc , yields ¦B
mh = ¦B
dc. Hence, given the exogenous parameters, in a multihoming
equilibrium, the bank can never be worse o® than in a debit card equilibrium. Substituting
Fmax
T (fdc;fcc); ®(fdc); ¯(fcc) into (14), let us denote f¤¤
dc and f¤¤
cc the pro¯t-maximizing fees
of ¦B
mh(fdc;fcc) in de multihoming case.26
Lemma 4 All else being equal, optimal multihoming pro¯ts dominate optimal bank pro¯ts in




cc ) ¸ ¦B
dc(f¤
dc):
While \debit card only" equilibria are nested within the multihoming environment, \credit
card only" equilibria are not. When ® ¸ ¯, high debit card merchant fees also drives out
credit cards.
For a given cost level cdc, there exists a c0
cc > cdc such that optimal bank pro¯ts across




dc) for ccc = c0
cc. This must
be the case, since|all else being equal|credit cards widen consumption possibilities from




cc . Numerical approximations are reported in





28Table 4: Comparison of pro¯t-maximizing outcomes
high cost: ccc = 0:017 > c¤
cc low cost: ccc = 0:015 < c¤
cc
Debit Credit Multi- Debit Credit Multi-
only only homing only only homing
f¤
dc 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
f¤
cc 0.023 0.024 0.021 0.023
®¤ 0.592 0.592 0.592 0.592
¯¤ 0.390 0.325 0.449 0.392
p¤
dc 1.003 1.003 1.003 1.003
p¤
cc 1.011 1.012 1.011 1.011
Bank pro¯t ¦B 51.46 52.00 52.13 51.46 74.51 52.51
breakout:
Consumer revenue RC 124.24 217.09 315.84 124.24 259.38 355.12
Merchant revenue RM 100.44 262.23 104.42 100.44 282.79 104.89
Default loss Cdef 0.00 -232.24 -192.81 0.00 -267.24 -232.17
Processing cost Cproc -173.22 -195.08 -175.32 -173.22 -200.43 -175.33
Note: Parameter values set to cdc = 0:01, ½ = 0:99, Á1 = 0:98, Á2 = 0, ¸cc = ¸dc = 0:5, and I = 30000.
which the bank can extract some surplus. For ccc ¸ c0
cc, the debit card equilibrium yields
higher bank pro¯ts. Since optimal multihoming pro¯ts are higher than optimal debit card
pro¯ts, there must exist a cdc · c00
cc · c0
cc such that optimal multihoming bank pro¯ts (just)
dominate both debit card only and credit card only pro¯ts. Hence, for ccc ¸ c00
cc, the bank
maximizes pro¯ts by issuing credit cards in addition to debit cards. On the other hand, for
credit card processing cost ccc < c00
cc, a credit card only environment would be preferred by the
bank, because the relatively high markup on credit cards would be pro¯table in all income
states. The next proposition summarizes these ¯ndings. Table 4 illustrates both situations.
Proposition 8 All else being equal, there exists a c00
cc > cdc such that for ccc > c00
cc optimal
multihoming pro¯ts dominate optimal debit card and credit card pro¯ts when only one type













This result may provide as some guidance on the evolution of debit and credit cards in
various parts of the world. In the United States, credit cards along with signature-based
debit cards were highly promoted over PIN-based debit cards. However, in other parts of the
world, PIN-based debit cards are primarily used and credit cards are not used domestically,
29e.g. the Netherlands. In other cases, one card serves as debit cards but allows for payment
at the end of the month, e.g. France.
6.2 Uniform Pricing
Now, let us consider merchants that are only able to post one price. Unlike before, prices
for goods were uniform across merchants for a given payment instrument. When merchants
post one price, we assume that their new one price is the average of the prices weighted by
the probability that consumers would use each instrument that they accept. For example, if
there is equal probability of a consumer using a debit card or a credit card, the uniform price
would be:
pu = :5pdc + :5pcc
In this economy, all credit card accepting merchants post the same price which is di®erent
from the uniform price of debit card accepting merchants. Cash-only merchants post price,
pm.
Let's assume that credit cards are preferred to debit cards when pdc = pcc at merchants ac-
cepting both debit and credit cards.27 In this case, pu = pcc for merchants that accept credit
cards since all consumers would use their credit cards even though all consumers would be
better o® if consumers receiving income the morning used their debit cards because pu would
be lower. The consumer's participation constraint becomes:
Á1 [(1 ¡ ®)½(I ¡ Fdc) + ®(I ¡ Fdc)=pdc] ·
Á1 [(1 ¡ ®)½(I ¡ Fdc ¡ Fcc) + (® ¡ ¯)(I ¡ Fdc ¡ Fcc)=pdc +
¯(I ¡ Fdc ¡ Fcc)=pcc] + (1 ¡ Á1)¯(I ¡ Fdc ¡ Fcc)=pcc:
If pdc = pcc and all merchants accepting debit cards also accept credit cards, consumers
would never choose to participate in both networks and not multihome. If there is a su±cient
mass of merchants that do not accept credit cards, there may be an incentive to hold debit
cards.
The maximum total fee Fmax
Tu under full multihoming and uniform prices pdc = pcc at
27We rule out the possiblity that pd > pc. However, there are examples of payment card prices being lower
than cash, see Benoit (2002) and National Public Radio (2006).
30merchants that accept debit and credit cards is given by:
Fmax
Tu =
¯(1 ¡ Á1) + Á1®(1 ¡ pdc½)
¯(1 ¡ Á1) + Á1(®(1 ¡ pdc½) + pdc½)
I: (15)
Similar to the cases when merchants issued only one card, merchants choose to accept
payment cards if by doing so their pro¯ts increase. A key feature of our model is the ability
to set di®erent prices based on the payment instrument used to purchase goods. However,
there may be regulatory, contractual, and other reasons why we seldom see a menu of prices.28
Now, we consider the case when merchants cannot charge di®erent prices. If merchants charge
the same price regardless of the type of payment instrument used, bank pro¯ts become:
¦B
mhu = (Á1(® ¡ ¯)(fdc ¡ cdc) + ¯(fcc ¡ ccc))(I ¡ FT)+ (16)
(Á1 + Á2)FT ¡ (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)¯(I ¡ FT):
The bank prefers uniform pricing to merchants' steering of consumers by applying dif-
ferential pricing. To see this, we assume that consumers are atomistic and cannot collude.
Suppose each consumer receives additional bene¯t, ², when using credit cards instead of debit
cards when there is a uniform price. Because each consumer selects the card that o®ers them
the greatest bene¯ts, they all face the higher uniform price where no debit card transactions
occur. In other words, consumers are in a prisoner's dilemma where the sum of their individ-
ual actions result in a worse allocation. The increase in the uniform price when one consumer
defects is marginal. Merchants are worse o® because they must pay higher processing costs
when some consumers could have used less expensive payment instruments and cannot o®er
price incentives to steer consumers away from credit cards that do not need the extension of
credit.
Proposition 9 When merchants set one price regardless of the type of instrument used, the
bank earns greater pro¯ts if revenue from credit cards are higher than debit cards and the
default risk is su±ciently low than when merchants steer consumers through price incentives.
Our result is consistent with other results when only one payment instrument is consid-
ered. The main intuition here is that merchants prefer to separate consumers by those that
28See Chakravorti and Shah (2003), Barron, Staten, and Umbeck (1992), IMA Market Development (2000),
and Katz (2001) for more discussion about merchant pricing based on payment instrument.
31have funds and those that do not whereas the bank prefers to entice consumers to the more
pro¯table payment network. Some cost studies suggest that credit card transactions require
more real resources suggesting that there is a potential welfare gain from encouraging less
costly payment instruments assuming that consumer utility is unchanged. However, lack
of incentives such as lower prices charged by merchants to use certain payment instruments
over others may encourage less e±cient payment instruments.
7 Conclusion
We construct a model of payment instrument choice and acceptance where consumers and
merchants bene¯t from greater consumption and sales that arise from transactions that would
not occur in a cash-only economy. We incorporate insurance motives into the payments
context that are well established in the banking literature as justi¯cation for why ¯nancial
institutions play a critical role in the economy. We derive the equilibrium fees from param-
eter values that support debit and credit cards. In our model, the bank will fully extract
from consumers before capturing surplus from merchants. Merchants pay for payment ser-
vices when the bank cost to operate the system is su±ciently high, merchants are unable to
su±ciently pass on their payment processing costs, consumer credit risk is too high, or some
combination of these factors.
We compare welfare-maximizing fee structures to pro¯t-maximizing ones and ¯nd that
they di®er on the allocation of fees to consumers. A social planner prefers zero consumer
fees whereas the bank prefers to fully extract consumers. However, the optimal merchant fee
for the social planner may be the same as the pro¯t-maximizing one. There are cases when
the social optimal fee results in negative bank pro¯ts. If a zero condition for bank pro¯t is
imposed, the social optimal fee structure can vary.
Furthermore, we study consumer and merchant multihoming where consumers and mer-
chants participate in multiple payment networks. Di®erences in merchant acceptance across
payment instruments and prices along with insurance against theft and no income states de-
termine when consumers carry multiple payment instruments. When both types of payment
instruments are available, merchants would prefer the ability to separate liquid consumers
from illiquid ones whereas the bank may have incentives to entice all consumers to use their
32credit cards in stores that accept both types of cards.
Given the current complexity of the model, we have left out key features of the payment
card market. First, we have not considered long-term credit. Such an extension would
require a model that considers credit cycles. Second, we ignore competition among banks in
the provision of services that could put downward pressure on prices. Others have found that
competition would occur on the consumer side and put upward pressure on merchant fees.
Third, we assume that all consumers multihome. In reality, not all consumers multihome
and the uniform price may not be equal to the price of the most expensive instrument for
the merchant to accept. We leave these extensions for future research.
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Proof of Proposition 1:
First, when extending ¦B
dc(fdc) to allow for negative merchant fees fdc < 0 (so that by
de¯nition acceptance ® = 1), it easy to verify that the pro¯t function ¦B
dc(fdc) is continuous
in fdc. For large enough ¸dc we calculate that @¦B
dc(fdc)=@fdc = 0 when fd < 0. Second,
non-negative pro¯t exists for small enough processing cost. That is, for cdc = 0, ¦B
dc(0) =
(1¡½)(Á1 +Á2)I > 0. Third, for small enough cdc = 0, the optimal fee that maximizes bank
pro¯t lies between 0 and 1 ¡ ½. Solving @¦B
dc(fdc)=@fdc = 0 yields two possible outcomes
corresponding to a minimum and a maximum. Verifying the second-order conditions yields
the pro¯t-maximizing merchant fee:
f¤
dc(cdc;½;Á1;Á2;¸dc) =
(1 ¡ ½)((1 ¡ ¸dc)(cdcÁ1 + Á2) ¡ ¸dcÁ1)
((1 ¡ ¸dc)cdc ¡ ¸dc(2 ¡ ¸dc ¡ ½))Á1 + (1 ¡ ¸dc)2Á2
+
p
(1 ¡ ½)Á1¸dc(1 ¡ cdc(1 ¡ ¸dc) ¡ ½)(½(cdcÁ1 + Á2) ¡ ¸dc(Á1 + Á2))
((1 ¡ ¸dc)cdc ¡ ¸dc(2 ¡ ¸dc ¡ ½))Á1 + (1 ¡ ¸dc)2Á2
:
Solving f¤
dc(cdc;½;Á1;Á2;¸dc) = 0 for cdc yields cdc, and solving f¤
dc(cdc;½;Á1;Á2;¸dc) =
1¡½ gives ¹ cdc. Hence, if 0 5 cdc 5 cdc then f¤
dc = 0, else if cdc 5 cdc 5 ¹ cdc then 0 < f¤
dc 5 1¡½.
Fourth, as long as ¸dc = ¸ =1-
½Á1
Á1+Á2, it holds that cdc 5 ¹ cdc. If 0 < ¸dc < ¸dc one can
always ¯nd a small enough cdc such that f¤
dc = 0 yields the global maximum, independent
of ¸dc. Fifth, if ¸dc = 0 then only cdc = 0 and Á2 = 0 are consistent with constant pro¯ts
¦B
dc = (1 ¡ ½)Á1I, independent of fdc. Otherwise, for ¸dc = 0; pro¯ts are decreasing in fdc
and approach (Á2 + (1 ¡ ½)Á1)I for fdc ! ¡1.
Proof of Proposition 2:







fdc(cdc ¡ fdc)(1 ¡ fdc ¡ ½)½Á1
(1 ¡ fdc)(1 ¡ fdc(1 ¡ ¸dc) ¡ ½)2I = 0;
since it is straightforward to verify that f¤
dc(cdc;½;Á1;Á2;¸dc) 5 cdc for large enough ½ and
small enough cdc.
Proof of Proposition 3:
First note that there is no card usage for fdc ¸ 1 ¡ ½, and thus debit card welfare is equal
to cash welfare in that price region. Second, we can verify that @Wdc(Fdc;fd)=@Fdc 5 0
for su±ciently large ½, so that the social planner wants to set Fdc = 0 (assuming it cannot
tax economic agents to ¯nance negative ¯xed fees). Third, for small enough cdc = 0; non-
negative debit card welfare exists, in particular Wdc(0;0) = 3Á1I=2 > 0 for cdc = 0, and
solving @Wdc(Fdc;fd)=@fdc = 0 yields the socially optimal merchant fee
fSW
dc (cdc;½;¸dc) =
(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ 2¸dc)
1 ¡ ¸dc(3 ¡ 2¸dc)
+
p
¸dc(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ 2¸dc)(2cdc(1 ¡ ¸dc) ¡ (1 ¡ ½)(2 ¡ ¸dc))
1 ¡ ¸dc(3 ¡ 2¸dc)
:
37Solving fSW
dc (cdc;½;¸dc) = 0 for cdc yields cSW
dc = (1 ¡ ½)(1 + ¸cc)=2¸cc, and solving
fSW
dc (cdc;½;Á1;Á2;¸dc) = 1 ¡ ½ gives ¹ cSW
dc = (1 ¡ ½)(1 + ¸cc). Hence, if 0 5 cdc 5 cSW
dc then
fSW
dc = 0, else if cSW
dc 5 cdc 5 ¹ cSW
dc then 0 < fSW
dc 5 1 ¡ ½. Fourth, as long as ¸dc = 1=2, it
holds that cdc 5 ¹ cdc. If 0 5 ¸dc < 1=2 and cdc 5 ¹ cdc, then fSW
dc = 0 yields maximum social
welfare (3=2 ¡ cdc)Á1I, independent of ¸dc
Proof of Proposition 4:
For ¸dc = 1=2 and su±ciently large ½, we can show that cdc 5 cSW
dc which proves the propo-
sition. For ¸dc < 1=2 and cdc 5 ¹ cdc; it holds fSW
dc = 0 5 f¤
dc.
Proof of Proposition 5:
First, when extending ¦B
cc(fcc) to allow for negative merchant fees fcc < 0 (so that by
de¯nition acceptance ¯ = 1), it easy to verify that the pro¯t function ¦B
cc(fcc) is continuous
in fcc. For large enough ¸cc we calculate that @¦B
cc(fcc)=@fcc = 0 when fcc < 0. Second,
non-negative pro¯t exists for small enough processing cost. That is for ccc = 0, ¦B
cc(0) =
((1 ¡ ½)Á1 + Á2)I > 0. Third, for small enough ccc = 0, the optimal fee that maximizes
pro¯ts lies between 0 and 1 ¡ ½Á1. Solving @¦B
cc(fcc)=@fcc = 0 yields two possible outcomes
corresponding to a minimum and a maximum. Verifying the second-order conditions yields
the pro¯t-maximizing merchant fee:
f¤
cc(ccc;½;Á1;Á2;¸cc) =
(1 ¡ ½)Á1(¸cc ¡ (1 ¡ ¸cc)ccc)
¸cc(1 ¡ (¸cc + ½ ¡ 1)Á1 + (1 ¡ ¸cc)Á2) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸cc)ccc
¡
p
¸cc(1 ¡ ½Á1)((1 ¡ ¸cc)ccc ¡ (1 ¡ ½)Á1 ¡ Á2 ¡ ¸cc(1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2))(½Á1ccc ¡ ¸cc(Á1 + Á2)))
¸cc(1 ¡ (¸cc + ½ ¡ 1)Á1 + (1 ¡ ¸cc)Á2) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸cc)ccc
:
Solving f¤
cc(ccc;½;Á1;Á2;¸cc) = 0 for ccc yields ccc, and solving f¤
cc(ccc;½;Á1;Á2;¸cc) =
1 ¡ ½Á1 gives ¹ ccc. As long as ¸cc = ¸cc =1-½Á1, it holds that ccc < 0 5 ¹ ccc and thus
0 < f¤
cc 5 1 ¡ ½Á1 for 0 5 ccc 5 ¹ ccc. Fourth, if ¸cc < ¸cc then one can always ¯nd a small
enough ccc such that f¤
cc > 0 yields the global maximum. Fifth, if ¸cc = 0 then only ccc = 0
is consistent with constant pro¯ts ¦B
cc = (Á2 + (1 ¡ ½)Á1)I, independent of fcc. Otherwise,
for ccc > 0 and ¸cc = 0, pro¯ts are decreasing in fcc and approach (Á2 + (1 ¡ ½)Á1)I for
fcc ! ¡1.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Solving f¤
cc = ccc for Á2 yields:
Á2 =
¸cc(1 ¡ ½Á1)(1 ¡ Á1) ¡ ccc(1 ¡ ½Á1 + ¸cc)(1 ¡ ½Á1)




cc(2(1 ¡ ½Á1) ¡ ¸cc((1 ¡ ½Á1 ¡ Á1) + Á1¸cc)) ¡ c3
cc(1 ¡ ¸cc)
¸cc(1 ¡ ½Á1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¸cc)c2
cc)
:
We can show that Á2 = 1 ¡ Á1 when ccc = 0 and there exists e ccc > 0 such that Á2 = 0
and dÁ2=dccc < 0. Thus, for 0 5 ccc 5 e ccc we have 0 5 Á2 5 1 ¡ Á1.
Proof of Proposition 7:
First note that there is no card usage for fcc ¸ 1¡½Á1, and thus credit card welfare is equal
to cash welfare in that price region. Second, we can verify that @Wcc(Fcc;fc)=@Fcc 5 0 for
su±ciently large Á1, so that the social planner wants to set Fcc = 0 (assuming it cannot
38tax economic agents to ¯nance negative ¯xed fees). Third, for small enough ccc = 0; non-
negative debit card welfare exists, in particular Wcc(0;0) = 3I=2 > 0 for ccc = 0, and solving
@Wcc(Fcc;fcc)=@fcc = 0 yields the socially optimal merchant fee
fSW
cc (ccc;½;¸cc) =
(1 ¡ ½Á1)(1 ¡ 2¸cc)
1 ¡ ¸cc(3 ¡ 2¸cc)
+
p
¸cc(1 ¡ ½Á1)(1 ¡ 2¸cc)(2ccc(1 ¡ ¸cc) ¡ ¸cc(1 ¡ (2 ¡ ½)Á1 ¡ 2Á2) ¡ 2((1 ¡ ½)Á1 + Á2))
1 ¡ ¸cc(3 ¡ 2¸cc)
:
Solving fSW
cc (cdc;½;¸dc) = 0 for ccc yields cSW
cc = ((1¡¸cc)¡(2¡½)Á1¸cc¡½Á1)=2¸cc+Á2,
and solving fSW
cc (ccc;½;Á1;Á2;¸dc) = 1 ¡ ½ gives ¹ cSW
cc = ¸cc(1 ¡ ½Á1) + (1 ¡ ½)Á1 + Á2. If
¸cc ¸ 1 ¡ ½Á1 and 1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2 close to zero then ccc < 0 5 cSW
cc . Hence, when 0 5 ccc 5 cSW
cc
it holds that fSW
dc = 0 < f¤
cc: Fourth, as long as ¸cc = 1=2, we ¯nd that cSW
cc 5 ¹ cSW
cc . If
0 5 ¸dc < 1=2 and ccc 5 ¹ cSW
cc , then fSW
cc = 0 yields maxmum social welfare (3=2 ¡ ccc)I,
independent of ¸cc.
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